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Abstract 
Constructive empiricism implies that if van Fraassen does not believe that scientific theories 
and his positive philosophical theories, including his contextual theory of explanation, are 
empirically adequate, he cannot accept them, and hence he cannot use them for scientific and 
philosophical purposes. Moreover, his epistemic colleagues, who embrace epistemic 
reciprocalism, would not believe that his positive philosophical theories are empirically 
adequate. This epistemic disadvantage comes with practical disadvantages in a social world. 
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Introduction 
Bas van Fraassen (2017) argues that we are rational to believe and disbelieve T,
1
 a scientific 
theory that best explains phenomena, relying on the English view of rationality. In addition, 
he thinks that the belief of T is supererogatory. As a result, he disbelieves T. Park (2019b) 
objects that van Fraassen’s disbelief of T backfires on his (1980) contextual theory of 
explanation and on the empiricist position that T is empirically adequate, appealing to 
epistemic reciprocalism according to which “we ought to treat our epistemic colleagues, as 
they treat their epistemic colleagues” (Park 2017, 57). 
Richard Healey (2019) objects that van Fraassen believes neither that the contextual 
theory is true, nor that T is empirically adequate, and so my criticisms against van Fraassen’s 
position misfire. This paper responds to Healey’s defense of van Fraassen’s position from my 
criticisms. I unfold the epistemic and practical disadvantages of disbelieving that T and van 
Fraassen’s positive philosophical theories are empirically adequate. This paper will be a 
reminder that we are social epistemic agents. 
 
The Contextual Theory 
Park (2019b) objects that epistemic reciprocalists, invoking the English view of rationality, 
would argue that we are rational to believe and disbelieve the contextual theory, and that van 
Fraassen ought to disbelieve the contextual theory just as he disbelieves T. In addition, 
epistemic reciprocalists would disbelieve the contextual theory on the grounds that it is 
superfluous to believe it. This epistemic disadvantage comes with practical disadvantages. 
                                         
1 Park (2019a) criticizes in detail van Fraassen’s view that we are rational to believe and disbelieve T. This paper, 
however, assumes that van Fraassen’s view is correct. 
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Imagine, for example, that van Fraassen thinks that the contextual theory is great, so he 
applies for a scholarly award for it. The award committee, embracing epistemic reciprocalism, 
rejects his application on the grounds that they disbelieve the contextual theory. In addition to 
such a practical disadvantage, there are other practical disadvantages of disbelieving T, as 
Park (2018, 2019c) discusses in detail, but I do not invoke them in this paper due to space 
concerns. 
How does Healey defend van Fraassen’s position from my foregoing criticisms against 
van Fraassen’s position? Healey argues that van Fraassen is not committed to the truth of the 
contextual theory. His first argument for this interpretation of van Fraassen’s position goes as 
follows. According to van Fraassen, a theory is a collection of models, and models are 
abstract entities, so he would say that the contextual theory is a collection of abstract entities. 
He cannot believe the contextual theory, “for that would involve believing in the existence of 
all the unobservable abstracta that feature in the relevant models” (Healey 2019, 26).  
This interpretation presupposes that van Fraassen cannot believe that abstract entities 
are real because he does not believe that T is true. The presupposition would be endorsed by 
many philosophers of mathematics, such as Willard Quine (1948), Hilary Putnam (1971), and 
Alan Baker (2012). On these philosophers’ account, the confirmation of T is a means to 
arrive at the belief that the mathematical constituents of T are true, and hence some 
mathematical entities exist in the abstract world. For them, it follows that if van Fraassen 
disbelieves T, he cannot believe that mathematical entities are real. Let me add that if it is 
gratuitous to believe in the existence of concrete entities, such as neutrinos and dark matter, it 
is a fortiori gratuitous to believe in the existence of abstract entities, such as models and 
triangles. After all, T is about concrete entities. Concrete entities are causally connected with 
human brains, whereas abstract entities are not. So abstract entities are epistemically more 
remote from us than concrete entities are.  
Let me now turn to Healey’s contention that since van Fraassen believes that a theory 
is a set of models, he cannot believe the contextual theory. We can draw a more skeptical 
conclusion: van Fraassen cannot even believe that some observational consequences of the 
contextual theory or T are true. Thus, he can believe none of what the contextual theory about 
science and none of what T says about the world because he believes that the contextual 
theory and T are collections of models. It seems to me that the only way for him to avoid this 
extremely skeptical position is to withdraw his view that a theory is a collection of models. 
Let me now turn to Healey’s next argument for his interpretation of van Fraassen’s 
position that van Fraassen does not believe the contextual theory. According to Healey, van 
Fraassen never says that he believes that the contextual theory is true, but van Fraassen says 
that the contextual theory is “basically correct” (van Fraassen 1980, 146). Healey adds that 
van Fraassen’s phrase, ‘basically correct,’ can be charitably interpreted as acceptable: 
 
While Van Fraassen never says that he believes his own theory is true, he does say that he 
believes it is “basically correct” (146). Even an unsympathetic reader who does not 
distinguish between ‘correct’ and ‘true’ here must acknowledge a gap between ‘correct’ and 
‘basically correct’. A more sympathetic reader would rather identify ‘correct’ with 
‘acceptable’ and take Van Fraassen here to be stating his belief that, while not acceptable as 
it stands, some development of (CT) will be acceptable. (Healey 2019, 26) 
 
How do I respond to this interpretation of van Fraassen’s position? Let me point out that in 
another place, van Fraassen says that the contextual theory is not just basically correct but 
correct simpliciter: 
   
To be successful, a theory of explanation must accommodate, and account for, both rejections  
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and asymmetries. I shall now examine some attempts to come to terms with these, and gather 
from them the clues to the correct account. (van Fraassen 1980, 112) 
 
Let me add that in other places, van Fraassen talks as if he believes the contextual theory. For 
example, he states, “An explanation is an answer to a why-question” (van Fraassen 1980, 
134), and “among the scientifically relevant factors, context determines explanatorily 
relevant ones” (van Fraassen 1980, 126). It seems to me that he cannot say such sentences 
without believing the contextual theory, and that if he does not believe it, his sentences 
mislead his readers into thinking that he believes it. 
I, however, set aside this interpretational issue. I am happy to go along with Healey’s 
interpretation of van Fraassen’s position. Now, Healey contends that since van Fraassen is 
not committed to the truth of the contextual theory, my criticism against van Fraassen’s 
position misfires: 
 
I have shown that Van Fraassen can happily admit that he does not believe that (CT) is true, 
while consistently maintaining that it is basically correct. Does this leave Van Fraassen in a 
disastrous position? I don’t see that it does. If I were Van Fraassen I would consider 
Seungbae’s attack on my contextual theory of explanation successfully repulsed. Turning his 
own voluntarist epistemology against him has not dislodged him from that position. (Healey 
2019, 27) 
 
To say, however, that van Fraassen does not believe the contextual theory means that he 
would have to bite the bullet, enduring all the aforementioned epistemic and practical 
disadvantages of not believing the contextual theory. It is not clear what would motivate him 
to endure them. In general, we endure certain disadvantages of a position when there are 
overriding advantages to it. I see, however, only one advantage of van Fraassen’s position, 
viz., having no chance to have a false belief about the contextual theory. I do not see any 
additional advantage to it. 
The aforementioned bullet is a pretty big one. The size of the bullet can be gauged with 
the use of the following example. An introductory philosophy of science book (Hung 1996) 
has a chapter on scientific explanation. The chapter introduces rival theories of scientific 
explanation: the deductive-nomological theory, the causal theory, the contextual theory, and 
the unificatory theory. The chapter conveys the content of the contextual theory to readers, 
but it does not have the caveat: “Van Fraassen disbelieves the contextual theory.” Without the 
caveat, however, readers assume that he believes the contextual theory. In other words, 
conveying the content of the contextual theory without the caveat misleads readers into 
thinking that van Fraassen believes the contextual theory. Suppose that there are many 
introductory philosophy of science books in front of us, and that all of them have chapters on 
rivaling theories of explanation, including the contextual theory. We can say, “If we take in 
our hand any philosophy of science book, let us ask, ‘Does it have the caveat that van 
Fraassen disbelieves the contextual theory?’ No. Commit it then to the flames, for it misleads 
readers.”2 
I suspect that instructors of introductory philosophy of science courses do not 
announce to their students in classrooms that van Fraassen disbelieves the contextual theory 
                                         
2 This sentence is intended to echo David Hume’s famous passage: “If we take in our hand any volume–of divinity 
or school metaphysics, for instance–let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does 
it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can 
contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (Hume 1748/1955, 1173). 
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when they introduce the rival theories of scientific explanation, including the contextual 
theory. I suppose that if they do, many of their students would feel less motivated to make 
efforts to understand the contextual theory, and that even if they understood it with little 
effort, they would find it less convincing. In general, you are a leader with respect to your 
positive theory, whatever it is. If you declare that you disbelieve it, others are not likely to 
believe it (Park 2019c, Section 4). 
Imagine that van Fraassen says, “I disbelieve my contextual theory. I don’t care 
whether philosophy of science books have the caveat or not. I don’t care either whether 
instructors of introductory philosophy of science courses announce the caveat to students or 
not.” How would epistemic reciprocalists respond to the disinterested philosopher? They 
would have nothing to say to him except, “OK. As you wish.  I happily disbelieve your 
theory. I’ll put the caveat in my manuscript and announce the caveat to my students in my 
course. Have a great day.” In sum, the rivaling interlocutors would go their own ways. 
 
The Empiricist Position 
I stated that “van Fraassen (1985, 294) chooses the belief that T is empirically adequate” 
(2019b, 92). Healey retorts that van Fraassen (1985, 294) criticizes scientific realism without 
committing to the empiricist position that T is empirically adequate, and that it is wrong for 
me to attribute the position to van Fraassen: 
 
Who occupies this “empiricist position”? Since Park’s paper is directed against Van Fraassen   
he apparently takes this to be Van Fraassen’s position. But it is not. (CE) does not imply that a 
theory that best explains some data is (merely) empirically adequate. Since it is not an 
epistemological position, neither does (CE) imply that a scientist should believe that such a 
theory is (merely) empirically adequate. (Healey 2019, 27) 
 
It is a tricky issue whether van Fraassen is committed to the empiricist position or not. In the 
literature, some writers attribute the position to him, while other writers accuse them of 
misinterpreting constructive empiricism. For example, Mario Alai says that according to 
constructive empiricism, “all we need to believe is that a theory is empirically adequate” 
(Alai 2017, 21). Stathis Psillos (1997) argues that it takes an epistemic privilege to believe in 
the empirical adequacy of T. K. Brad Wray objects that “the constructive empiricist is not 
committed to claiming that our best theories are in fact empirically adequate” (Wray 2012, 
378). Healey has just joined Wray’s camp, which is fair enough.  
Wray and Healey’s interpretation of constructive empiricism is not without grounds. 
Constructive empiricism holds that “Science aims to give us theories which are empirically 
adequate,” and “acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate” 
(van Fraassen 1980, 12). Constructive empiricism, thus defined, is a thesis about what 
science aims for and what belief acceptance of T involves.
3
 It is not a thesis about whether T 
is empirically adequate or not. Hence, it appears that Wray and Healey are right to say that 
van Fraassen is not committed to the empiricist position.  
To say so, however, entails that van Fraassen cannot accept T. After all, the definition 
of constructive empiricism implies that if van Fraassen were a constructive empiricist and 
accepts T, he would believe in the empirical adequacy of it, and that if he accepts T and yet 
does not believe in the empirical adequacy of it, he is not a constructive empiricist. Now, if 
                                         
3 To accept T is to commit to using it for scientific purposes, such as predicting and explaining. See Park (2018, 32–
36; 2019c, Section 4) for the exposition and critical evaluation of  van Fraassen’s notion of  acceptance. 
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van Fraassen did not accept T, he could never use it to predict future events.
4
 As a result, he 
could not avail himself of the scientific knowledge about future events. The future events 
might include an earthquake that will occur in his place. This is the price that he would have 
to pay, according to constructive empiricism, for not believing in the empirical adequacy of T. 
Thus, to say that van Fraassen disbelieves in the empirical adequacy of T is to push him into 
this quagmire. 
There is another quagmire. If van Fraassen does not believe in the empirical adequacy 
of T, he ought not to believe either that his positive philosophical theories, including the 
contextual theory, are empirically adequate. It follows that he ought not to accept them, 
which implies that he ought not to use them for philosophical purposes. For example, he 
ought not to use the contextual theory to account for puzzling phenomena in science, such as 
asymmetries and rejections, which he (1980, 111) claims that his theory can explain, but his 
rival theories cannot.  
Moreover, scientific realists can play a similar game. Scientific realism holds that 
“Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like ,” and 
that “acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true” (van Fraassen 1980, 
8). Note that just like constructive empiricism, scientific realism is a thesis about what 
science aims for and what belief acceptance of T involves. It is not a thesis about whether T 
is true or not. It follows that just as constructive empiricists say, when attacked, that they 
disbelieve in the empirical adequacy of T, so scientific realists can say, when attacked, that 
they disbelieve in the truth of T. They might go further, saying that they even disbelieve in 
the empirical adequacy of T. For example, van Fraassen (1980, 39–40) explains the success 
of science not in terms of the truth of successful theories but rather in terms of the survival of 
successful theories. Scientific realists, as defined by van Fraassen, could reply that his attack 
misfires because scientific realism is not even committed to the empirical adequacy of 
successful theories, let alone to the truth of successful theories. 
Van Fraassen claims that “there is also a positive argument for constructive 
empiricism–it makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does and 
does so without inflationary metaphysics” (van Fraassen 1980, 73). In my view, this 
argument is simply a straw man fallacy. Scientific realism is not even committed to the 
empirical adequacy of T, to say nothing of inflationary metaphysics of T. Van Fraassen might 
reply that scientific realism asserts that T is true, so it is committed to inflationary 
metaphysics. This reply, however, gives rise to the burden of explicating why it is that his 
definition of scientific realism entails that T is true while his definition of constructive 
empiricism does not entail that T is empirically adequate. Recall that they are different views 
about what science aims for and what belief acceptance of T involves. They are not different 
views about whether T is true or empirically adequate.  
Disbelief in the empirical adequacy of T comes with more severe epistemic and 
pragmatic disadvantages than disbelief in the truth of T. Van Fraassen’s epistemic colleagues, 
if they embrace epistemic reciprocalism, would even disbelieve that his positive 
philosophical theories are empirically adequate. This epistemic disadvantage is accompanied 
by practical disadvantages. Imagine again that van Fraassen thinks that the contextual theory 
is great, so he applies for a scholarly award. The award committee would reject his 
                                         
4 He cannot explain events in terms of  T even if  he believes that T is empirically adequate. He should believe that T 
is true to explain events in terms of  T (Park 2018). Thus, constructive empiricists who accept T cannot explain 
events in terms of  T, although they may predict events with the use of  T. 
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application on the grounds that they do not believe that the contextual theory is empirically 
adequate. 
Imagine again that van Fraassen says, “I don’t believe my contextual theory is 
empirically adequate. I don’t care whether others believe or disbelieve it is empirically 
adequate.” How would epistemic reciprocalists respond to the disinterested philosopher? 
They would have nothing to say to him except, “OK. As you wish. I happily disbelieve your 
contextual theory is empirically adequate, so I happily reject your application for a scholarly 
award. Have a great day.” Again, the rivaling interlocutors would go their own ways. 
 
Successful Empiricism 
I defined skepticism as “the view that some observational consequences of T are true” (Park 
2019b, 92). This definition is in line with Larry Laudan’s definition of success that T is 
successful if and only “if it passes a battery of standard tests” (Laudan 1981, 23). To say that 
T passes tests entails that some, but not all, observational consequences of T are true. This 
definition of success goes hand in hand with Musgrave’s contention that the inference from 
the success of T to the empirical adequacy of it is similar to the inference that “some crows 
are black because all crows are” (Musgrave 1988, 242). In any event, skepticism is so named 
because it does not make the ampliative inference from success to empirical adequacy. Park 
(2019b, Subsection 3.2) put forward skepticism as a skeptical alternative to constructive 
empiricism. 
How does Healey respond to skepticism? He argues that constructive empiricism does 
not make the ampliative inference from success to empirical adequacy in the first place, so 
skepticism cannot be an alternative to constructive empiricism. To improve upon skepticism, 
he transforms it to what he calls destructive empiricism: 
 
Destructive Empiricism (DE): Science aims to give us theories some of whose observational 
consequences are true: and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that some of its 
observational consequences are true.” (Healey 2019, 28) 
 
I am convinced that destructive empiricism improves upon skepticism, and that it is a foil for 
constructive empiricism. Destructive empiricists are gadflies to constructive empiricists, just 
as constructive empiricists are to scientific realists. Healey’s formulation of destructive 
empiricism is, as far as I am concerned, his most valuable contribution to the present debate 
over van Fraassen’s position. 
Is destructive empiricism a viable alternative to constructive empiricism? Surprisingly, 
Healey answers, “No.” He rejects destructive empiricism on the grounds that it cannot 
explain scientific practice: 
 
A practice best explained by (DE) would not be recognizable as science. Any theory 
deliberately constructed to accommodate any existing observational data would be 
immediately accepted just because it accommodated them. The burden of testing a theory 
would immediately be lifted and epistemic doubts about it reduced to doubts about the data it 
was constructed to accommodate. Such an activity fails the most basic condition that 
scientific activity involve ampliative inference. The epistemic economy of (DE) is illusory: 
while it minimizes the epistemic cost of accepting a theory, this confers no associated benefit. 
Destructive empiricism deserves its name. (Healey 2019, 28–29) 
 
This criticism against destructive empiricism is beyond my comprehension. In my view, 
destructive empiricism does explain scientific practice. Consider the fact that many scientists 
apply successful theories to new parts of the world. For example, after using general 
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relativity to predict the bending of the light near a massive object, scientists used it to predict 
that gravitational waves would pass through the Earth. Scientists do this, according to 
destructive empiricists, because science aims for theories some of whose observational 
consequences are true and because scientists accept general relativity. Their acceptance 
involves the belief that some observational consequences of general relativity are true. 
According to constructive empiricists, by contrast, scientists do this because science aims for 
empirically adequate theories and because scientists accept general relativity. Their 
acceptance involves the belief that general relativity is empirically adequate.  
When constructive empiricists and destructive empiricists give these rivaling 
explanations of scientific activity, they attribute different epistemic attitudes to scientists 
concerning their new predictions. According to constructive empiricists, scientists are sure 
that their new predictions are true. After all, constructive empiricists attribute to scientists the 
belief that all observational consequences of general relativity are true, and hence the belief 
that their new predictions are true. According to destructive empiricists, by contrast, scientists 
are not sure that their new predictions are true. After all, destructive empiricists attribute to 
scientists the belief that some observational consequences of general relativity are true, and 
hence the belief that their new predictions might be true or might be false.  
To say that some observational consequences of T are true does not rule out the 
possibility that T can be used to make true predictions in new domains, so destructive 
empiricists do not ascribe to scientists the belief that T, which was successful in the old 
domains, will not be successful in the new domains. They rather ascribe to scientists the 
belief that T, which was successful in old domains, might be successful or might not be 
successful in new domains, thereby recognizing that ampliative inferences are operative in 
science.  
Healey claims that “Since (DE) is a wildly unsuccessful theory it would be irrational 
for him (or anyone else) to accept it” (Healey 2019, 29). Contrary to what he contends, I 
believe that destructive empiricism explains scientific practice, as we have seen above, so it 
is a successful philosophical theory. Therefore, destructive empiricism does not deserve its 
name, and it deserves a better name: ‘successful empiricism.’ 
 
Conclusion 
Healey (2019) argues that van Fraassen believes neither that the contextual theory is true, nor 
that T is empirically adequate. I replied that his interpretation of van Fraassen’s position is 
controversial. I, however, granted for the sake of argument that his interpretation is correct, 
and then exposed epistemic and pragmatic disadvantages of van Fraassen’s position thus 
interpreted. 
Specifically, I argued that if van Fraassen disbelieves that T is empirically adequate, he 
ought to disbelieve that his positive philosophical theories, including the contextual theory, 
are empirically adequate, and hence he ought not to accept T and his positive philosophical 
theories, which implies that he ought not to use them for scientific and philosophical 
purposes. Moreover, his epistemic colleagues, embracing epistemic reciprocalism, will 
disbelieve that his positive philosophical theories are empirically adequate, and they would 
reject his application for a scholarly award on the grounds that they disbelieve that his 
positive philosophical theories are empirically adequate. 
When van Fraassen’s position is under attack, his defenders typically say, “Van 
Fraassen didn’t say that,” “Van Fraassen doesn’t believe that,” “Van Fraassen doesn’t 
commit himself to that,” “You misrepresented van Fraassen’s position,” “You attacked the 
straw man,” and what have you. Admittedly, this defense strategy is effective in invalidating 
the criticisms from his critics, thereby bringing a victory to him. The victory, however, is a 
8 
Pyrrhic one. A skeptical position has epistemic and pragmatic price tags. The price tags are 
not negligible in a social world where cognitive agents interact with each other. My message 
to constructive empiricists is summarized in my previous slogan: “Believe me. I’ll believe 
you” (Park 2017, 64). 
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